framework. Informal cooperation existed since the early 1970s 1 and was subsequently transformed into binding international treaties such as the original Schengen Agree ment of 1985, the Schengen Implementing Convention of 1990 (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 1) and the Dublin Convention of 1990. 2 More detailed rules were laid down in the decisions of the Schengen Executive Committee and other bodies established under said Conventions, where national interior ministers adopted multiple implementing decisions, intergovernmental resolu tions or similar arrangements (this mode of decision making was often criticised as intransparent and undemocratic 3 ). These rules later became known as the 'Schengen Acquis' and formed the backbone of the EU immigration and asylum law, which will be discussed in this volume. While the UK and Ireland remained outside the Schengen framework, most other Member States joined Schengen (see below MN 42).
2
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht established a framework for decision making on justice and home affairs within the newly founded European Union, which maintained decidedly intergovernmental characteristics. At the time, the EU Treaty only allowed for the adoption of non binding joint positions or the elaboration of international treaties (not supranational directives and regulations), which would have to be ratified by national parliaments in line with established principles of public international law. 4 These rules on intergovernmental justice and home affairs in the Maastricht Treaty proved rather inefficient and produced little legally binding output. 5 Nevertheless, the informal arrangements provided a bedrock of common standards which the EU institutions could build on once the Treaty of Amsterdam established a more robust Treaty base for migration and asylum law within the supranational EC Treaty. 6 To satisfy British, Irish and Danish demands, these states were granted an opt out (see below MN 38 45). At the same time, the Schengen Acquis was incorporated into the EU framework, thereby giving more substance to the new Treaty bases (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 2 3).
3
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU institutions have been allowed to adopt regular Community instruments, in particular Directives and Regula tions, which can be directly applicable and benefit from primacy over domestic law in cases of conflict, in line with the established principles of the supranational legal order. Nonetheless, the transfer of immigration, asylum and border controls to the suprana tional 'first pillar' remained incomplete, since the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice continued specific institutional arrangements that diverged from the supranational decision making method. This was deemed necessary in order to take account of the political 'sensitiveness' of matters which had hitherto belonged to the core issues of Introduction Part A national sovereignty. 7 For that reason, the Council acted unanimously on proposals from the Commission or a Member State in most subject areas and the European Parliament was only consulted. Moreover, not all domestic courts could make pre liminary references to the Court of Justice. 8 The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in 2003, extended today's ordinary legislative procedure to some policy fields 9 and one year later the Council activated a bridging clause in the EC Treaty rendering more areas subject to qualified majority voting in the Council and co decision powers of the European Parliament. 10 However, full supranationalisation was brought about only by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which aligned immigration and asylum law with the orthodoxy of supranational decision making. In the age of the Lisbon Treaty we may conclude that the former 'ghetto' has been gentrified; Articles 77 80 TFEU are part and parcel of the supranational integration method. 11
4
The Treaty of Lisbon not only streamlined decision making procedures, but also broadened the scope of Union competences through a substantive revision of today's Articles 77 80 TFEU in line with the proposal of the erstwhile Constitutional Treaty, which never entered into force. The European Convention, which drafted the Constitu tional Treaty, was particularly active in the field of justice and home affairs and its conclusions on immigration and asylum retain full relevance, since they were later integrated in the Lisbon Treaty without major changes. 12 To understand the meaning of Treaty formulations such as 'integrated management system for external borders' (Article 77(2)(d) TFEU), it is helpful to consult the drafting documents of the European Convention. 13 The scope of EU competences on immigration and asylum will be discussed in more detail in the introductions to the different chapters of this commen tary dealing with border controls and visas (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 7 24), immigration (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immi gration Policy, MN 9 27) and asylum (see Hailbronner/Thym, Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy, MN 8 36).
Objectives for Law-Making 5
Besides the consolidation of Union competences, the Treaty of Lisbon endorsed the self sufficiency of EU immigration and asylum law in line with the reform steps agreed upon in the debate leading towards the Constitutional Treaty (see above MN 4). EU activity on the basis of Articles 77 80 TFEU is no longer presented as a spillover of the single market in line with the original assumption that the abolition of border controls within the Schengen area necessitated 'flanking measures' compensating Member States for the loss of control options at domestic borders (see Thym 
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Part A Entry and Border Controls, MN 3). Instead, immigration and asylum law has been reaffirmed as a self sufficient policy field in its own right within the area of freedom, security and justice, 14 which Article 3(2) TEU lists among the central objectives of the European project. The concept of the 'area of freedom, security and justice' was first introduced first by the Treaty of Amsterdam and was later reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon (in line with the Constitutional Treaty). It was conceived of as a grand design mirroring earlier projects to realise a single market or economic and monetary union, thereby pushing the process of European integration into new directions, although it should be acknowledged that it was not immediately clear what exactly the 'area of freedom, security and justice' was actually meant to mean. 15 
6
The conceptual autonomy of the area of freedom, security and justice confirms that EU immigration and asylum law does not replicate the mobility regime of Union citizens. Instead, immigration and asylum law is nowadays typified by a collection of diverse objectives laid down in the EU Treaties, which were introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. The abolition of internal borders is complemented by 'enhanced measures to combat illegal immigration' 16 which command 'compliance with the principle of non refoulement.' 17 Generally speaking, 'the efficient management of migration flows' 18 is to be accompanied by 'fair[ness] towards third country nationals.' 19 These objectives may be summarised under the heading of 'migration governance' a choice of terminology recognising that the migration control perspective of state authorities must accommo date legitimate interests of migrants. 20 Two basic features define the new Treaty regime and illustrate that the area of freedom, security and justice differs from the historic template of Union citizenship: firstly, legislation concerning third country nationals is not usually based on individual rights to cross border movement at constitutional level (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 28 36); secondly, the extended legislative discretion is not absolute, since EU legislation on immigration and asylum must respect human rights (see below MN 46 55).
7
The EU legislature benefits from principled discretion when it comes to realising the Treaty objectives for immigration and asylum law. The EU institutions are bound to promote the Treaty objectives, even if the latter do not regularly translate into judiciable yardsticks for secondary legislation. 21 In contrast to human rights (see below MN 46 55), the Treaty objectives cannot usually be relied on in situations of judicial review in order to challenge EU legislation. Academics may criticise the predominance of securitarian approaches focusing on migration control, 22 but such criticism remains inherently political as long as it does not fall foul of human rights standards. This principled discretion on the side of the legislature in realising the Treaty objectives is a general characteristic of Union law 23 and is reaffirmed, within the context of the area Introduction Part A of freedom, security and justice, by the inherent contradictions between different objectives. 24 Moreover, EU immigration and asylum law is not only bound to promote the objectives laid down in Articles 77 80 TFEU, since it must also contribute to the realisation of general objectives, such as 'full employment' (Article 3(1) TEU), which arguably supports restrained rules on the access of lesser qualified migrants for as long as unemployment remains ubiquitous among Union citizens. 25 The same applies to the objectives of external action, which include, among other things, the eradication of poverty in developing countries. 26 
Political Programming 8
In the initial stages of EU legislative harmonisation, the grand design of the area of freedom, security and justice established by the Treaty of Amsterdam (see above MN 6) was in need of an overarching rationale giving substance to the abstract notion of 'freedom, security and justice'. 27 This function was assumed by the programmes put forward by the European Council on the occasion of its meetings in Tampere 29 The theoretical underpinning of these programmes was met with criticism due to their lack of conceptual coherence across policy fields, 30 but the various programmes served important functions from a political perspective. Throughout the years, the focus of attention shifted in response to wider political and social developments in Europe and beyond. While the initial Tampere Programme was full of youthful enthusiasm, The Hague Programme was dominated by the fight against terrorism and the Stockholm Programme made a deliberate effort to balance security and human rights concerns in light of the new provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. 31 By contrast, the Ypres Guidelines are noticeably shorter and comprise only a few paragraphs with little substantive guidance. 32 The political programmes have therefore lost their practical impact; the earlier programmes, which have expired, can no longer be relied on.
9
From a legal perspective, the guidelines are political in nature in the sense that the institutions are free to deviate from their contents in the ordinary legislative proce 24 It is the prerogative of the legislature to decide how to balance the 'fair treatment' of third country nationals (Article 67(2) TFEU) and 'enhanced measures to combat illegal immigration' (Article 79(1) TFEU; emphasis added) short of human rights standards, which individuals can rely on in courts. 25 With regard to third countries, the objective of combating poverty (Article 21(2)(d) TEU) calls for measures to counter the 'brain drain' of highly qualified migrants from developing countries. 26 Cf. Article 21(2) TEU, which can be used as a legal argument to prevent 'brain drain. 
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Part A dure. 33 Doctrinally, the political programmes are therefore less relevant than the Treaty objectives introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which leave considerable discretion to the EU institutions but are nonetheless binding on them as a matter of principle (see above MN 7). The limited legal weight of the political programmes does not detract from their political significance; guidance from heads of state or government often supported the realisation of the area of freedom, security and justice when the European Council 'urged' hesitant interior ministers to 'speed up' legislation. 34 More recently, however, their impact has gone into a sharp decline. In noticeable contrast to the extensive prescriptions in earlier programmes, the Ypres Guidelines adopted in June 2014 are limited to general declarations of intent. 35 This demonstrates that the area of freedom, security and justice has reached a state of maturity. Change remains possible, but the various legislative instruments, which are commented upon in this volume, are now at the centre of attention. Political programming has lost its relevance.
II. Overarching Principles 1. Interpretation of EU Legislation 10
Immigration and asylum regulations and directives are interpreted according to the same principles that apply to secondary EU legislation in other areas. This implies that the established principles of legislative interpretation apply, in particular those derived from continental civil law jurisdictions by the ECJ. 36 In line with established case law, the supranational EU legal order has created its own legal system and is not subject to the interpretative principles of public international law. 37 Generally speaking, secondary legislation must therefore be interpreted in the light of the wording, the systemic structure (general scheme), the drafting history, the objectives and constitutional requirements, such as human rights or international law (see below MN 46 59) as well as the unwritten general principles of Union law (see below MN 21 27). 38 This commentary explores the interpretation of EU immigration and asylum law on the basis of these interpretative principles including in situations where there is currently no ECJ case law on a specific question.
11
It should be noted that contextual factors can complicate the straightforward operationalisation of the interpretative standards in practice. As a supranational and multilingual order, EU law often lacks the precision of domestic legal systems, where certain terms often have a precise doctrinal meaning that has been historically con 33 Article 68 TFEU on 'strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning' by the European Council does not detract from the political discretion of the Parliament, the Commission and the Council in the ordinary legislative procedure, which applies to the adoption of measures on the basis of Articles 77(2), 78(2) and 79(2) TFEU and during which they may decide not to follow the European Council. 34 
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Part A structed over the years. 39 Moreover, debates in the Council and between the EU institutions tend to follow the tradition of diplomatic negotiations resulting in open compromise formulae instead of clear guidance. 40 Poor drafting and lack of coordina tion between working parties can further entail that EU immigration and asylum legislation occasionally employs similar terminology and concepts, albeit with separate meanings in different legislative acts. 41 We should therefore apply the interpretative standards of EU immigration and asylum law in full awareness of the underlying supranational characteristics. In so doing, academics and judges should make an effort to build bridges between transnational debates (in English) and the enduring domestic discussions within the Member States in the respective national languages, 42 which the contributions to this commentary aim to integrate into their analysis. Commentators should not mistake the transnational debate in English for the only or main forum for legal debates about EU immigration and asylum law. 43 
12
While the Court of Justice has acquired a certain celebrity for dynamic interpreta tion, it should be noted that the most notorious examples of dynamic interpretation concerned essential Treaty concepts, such as the realisation of the single market or the promotion of Union citizenship. By contrast, immigration and asylum law does not necessarily benefit from a similar constitutional direction, since Treaty rules on the area of freedom, security and justice embrace diverse and occasionally conflicting objectives (see above MN 6 7). It is convincing, therefore, that the ECJ exhibits more sensitivity towards the choices of the EU legislature in areas where the EU Treaty awards the EU institutions a greater level of discretion. In the case law on immigration and asylum regulations and directives, there is a noticeable number of judgments developing their conclusion under recourse to the wording, general theme, objectives and other inter pretative principles mentioned above. 44 This confirms that the Court's approach towards secondary legislation is more conservative, from a methodological perspective, than towards Treaty law. The legislature holds the primary responsibility to offset the framework for EU immigration and asylum law in the ordinary legislative procedure on the basis of Articles 77 80 TFEU.
13
Questions of interpretation frequently arise with regard to the drafting history of a directive or regulation. In its earlier case law, the Court had generally attributed limited importance to the legislative history; 45 even common interpretative declarations of the Member States on the occasion of the adoption were considered irrelevant, with the Court relying on the primary importance of the fundamental freedoms, 46 
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Part A 12). In the area of freedom, security and justice, this technique cannot usually be employed. The Court should take the drafting history more seriously, not least since the information on the position of the various actors is now easily accessible through the Eur Lex portal of the EU institutions. 47 This information is particularly useful when addressing questions that have not yet been discussed in ECJ case law as many chapters to this commentary illustrate. The newly found prominence of historic interpretation extends to the EU Treaties mutatis mutandi, since the drafting docu ments of the rules on immigration and asylum in the Treaty of Lisbon and the European Convention preparing the Constitutional Treaty (see above MN 5) are easily accessible online. 48 Article 52(7) of the Charter expressly obliges judges at national and European level to give due regard to the official explanations. 49 
14
In the field of asylum and immigration, human rights and international legal standards have an enduring influence on the interpretation of EU law. In so far as public international law is concerned, the ECJ maintains that EU law must be interpreted in light of the international legal obligations of the European Union as a matter of principle, although there are some caveats concerning the direct applicability of international law as well as the obligations of the Member States to which the EU has not signed up (see below MN 58 59). In practice, the Geneva Convention holds a special position enshrined in Article 78(1) TFEU (see Hailbronner/Thym, Legal Frame work of EU Asylum Law, MN 8, 47). When it comes to human rights, Article 6 TEU leaves no doubt that they must be respected; secondary legislation can be struck down or interpreted in conformity with human rights, 50 as the ECJ has reaffirmed in a number of cases on immigration and asylum. 51 In practice, the European Convention of Human Rights plays a central role, since it informs the interpretation of the EU Charter (see below MN 49). There have been cases, however, where judges in Luxembourg preferred to focus on the general scheme of secondary legislation (MN 12) instead of embarking on a human rights analysis, especially in situations where the human rights dimension did not directly influence the outcome of the case. 52 Moreover, experts on immigration and asylum should recognise that the ECJ pays due regard to other constitutional principles, such as the division of competences between the European Union and the Member States, 53 which may entail that the assessment of national laws Introduction Part A beyond the scope of EU obligations are left to national constitutions and the ECHR (see below MN 47 48). The ECJ is not a specialised immigration and asylum tribunal, but rather a supreme court with broader constitutional responsibilities.
15
For historic reasons, the concept of direct effect and the related category of individual rights play a prominent role in the interpretation of Union law by the ECJ. 54 Judges recognise that migrants may have individual rights emanating from EU legislation 55 and that, in addition, exceptions to individual rights should be narrowly construed. 56 On this basis, the position of migrants can be advanced through a methodology of rights based interpretation, 57 whose outcome should reflect the broader constitutional context. In contrast to the single market and EU citizenship (see below MN 20), the individual rights of third country nationals in immigration and asylum legislation do not usually flow directly from rights to cross border movement with constitutional status. 58 Human rights, in particular, do not typically comprise a guarantee for migrants to be granted access to the European territory in the field of legal migration (see Thym, Legal Frame work for EU Immigration Law, MN 51). This implies that individual rights granted by the EU legislature can go beyond the level of protection prescribed by human rights, as the ECJ explicitly recognised in the case of family reunification. 59 When deciding on the scope of the statutory rights of migrants beyond the human rights requirement, the EU legislature determines the conditions and limits set forth in legislative instruments. Judges should generally respect these legislative choices, especially if secondary legisla tion provides for discretion on the side of national authorities in the application of statutory requirements for individual rights. 60 The contours of individual rights in EU legislation have to be determined under recourse to the interpretative principles, such as the wording, the telos or the general scheme (see above MN 10 12).
16
EU law experts are well aware of the fact that the ECJ frequently activates the principle of effet utile, which aims at the effective application of EU law in domestic legal orders and which is usually applied in conjunction with teleological interpretation promoting the objectives of supranational rules (see below MN 17). Unsurprisingly, the Court also activated the principle of effet utile in immigration and asylum law, for instance by preventing Member States from charging prohibitive fees that might render the realisation of statutory rights of migrants practically ineffective. 61 While the effet utile can work to the benefit of migrants, it is not intrinsically linked to this scenario, since it aims to promote the effectiveness of Union law as an end in itself. The advancement of individual rights on the basis of the effet utile concept by judges in Luxembourg has been essentially functional in order to promote the broader integration process; 62 if EU law pursues different objectives, the effet utile may direct interpretation 54 60 See, by way of example, in the field of visas ECJ, Koushkaki, C 84/12, EU:C:2013:862, paras 56 62; and for students ECJ, Ben Alaya, C 491/13, EU:C:2014:2187, paras 23 27, 33; in the German language version, the Court refers to a 'Beurteilungsspielraum' (not: 'Ermessen'), thereby emphasising that the discretion concerns the conditions under which individual rights come about. 61 
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Part A in other directions. Thus, the ECJ emphasised that the Return Directive 2008/115/EC aims to establish an effective policy of removal and repatriation of illegally staying foreigners 63 and that asylum seekers cannot benefit from individual rights under the former Dublin II Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 in situations that are not prescribed by human rights in light of, among other things, the general scheme and objective of said Regulation. 64 Essentially, the objectives to be promoted by the effet utile principle should be determined by means of statutory interpretation; they are dependent on the content and context.
17
Unfortunately, the ECJ can be superfluous when identifying the aims pursued by the EU legislature in the adoption of immigration and asylum rules. It has fluctuated, for instance, when identifying the main objective behind the Dublin Regulations between the identification of the Member States responsible for examining an asylum application 65 and effective access by individuals to the asylum procedure 66 (both objectives should probably be considered to underlie the Regulation in parallel). Similarly, the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC has been generally deemed to promote family reunification, 67 while Article 4(5) establishing a minimum age of 21 years was considered to prevent forced marriages (an objective that may conflict with the promotion of family reunification). 68 To say, moreover, that the Long Term Residents Directive 2003/109/EC pursues the objective of promoting the integration of long term residents may conceal the complexity that is inherent to interpreting of the concept of 'integration' lurking behind the seemingly well defined objective identified by the Court (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 43 47). Likewise, it can be treacherous to rely solely upon abstract formulations of a particular recital, since closer inspection of the recitals in the light of the drafting history (see above MN 13) will often expose that specific legislative acts pursue diverse and potentially conflicting objectives which reflect the diversity of opinions among the various participants in the legislative process in a democratic and pluralistic society. 69 In such scenarios, courts should discuss the plurality of objectives openly and address them, where appropriate, in the balancing exercise that underlies proportionality sensu stricto, whose outcome is determined by the relative weight of the objectives and interests at stake (see below MN 26).
18
It is not surprising that the ECJ supports the coherence of the supranational legal order by interpreting similar terms in an identical fashion whenever appropriate. This may entail that doctrinal concepts developed for other segments of Union law are applied to immigration and asylum instruments, 70 such as the concept of 'abuse', which was first developed for the field of economic market regulation (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 48 49) . However, such parallel interpreta tion of similar terminology is no foregone conclusion and depends on the context of the statutory rule under consideration. Occasionally, the legislature may expressly define certain concepts for the purpose of the specific legislative instruments. 71 In other Introduction Part A scenarios, consideration of the general theme and the objectives of the legislative acts in question may result in the conclusion that identical terms have a different meaning in different instruments. 72 It therefore has to be ascertained, in line with general inter pretative criteria (see above MN 10 12), whether and, if so, to what extent, different legislative acts may be interpreted in parallel.
19
The example of the ECJ case law on the Association Agreement between the EEC and Turkey and related Decisions of the Association Council which are often relied on as a harbinger of dynamic interpretation of similar terminology, 73 demonstrates both the potential and the limits of parallel interpretation. The 'so far as is possible' 74 formula employed by the ECJ reflects the wording of the Association Agreement with Turkey which stipulates explicitly that rules on Turkish citizens should be approximated to the economic freedoms in the single market. 75 This implies, in turn, that parallel interpreta tion ends where the objectives and the general scheme of Union law and the Association Agreement diverge; the 'so far as is possible' formula is inherently open ended and ultimately depends on the context 76 in a similar vein as the comparability of secondary legislation on immigration and asylum with other policy area has to be determined on a case by case basis (see above MN 18). In practice, this dependence on the context of the EEC Turkey Agreement entailed that even identically formulated provisions, such as the concept of public policy as a limit to free movement guaran tees, 77 have to be interpreted differently if the objectives and the general scheme do not support interpretative convergence. 78 
20
The considerations above demonstrate that it is a general feature of EU immigration and asylum law that the interpretation of specific rules depends on the broader statutory and constitutional context. It is therefore not convincing to maintain the generic argument that the interpretation of secondary legislation on immigration and asylum by the ECJ will support a sort of domino effect that confers equal rights as Union citizens upon third country nationals. 79 There is no legal expectation enshrined at Treaty level that third country nationals and Union citizens should have similar rights. EU citizens benefit from individual rights emanating from the Treaty concept of Union citizenship, while third country nationals cannot rely upon legal guarantees of cross border movement with constitutional status in regular circumstances (see above 72 See, by way of example, the divergent interpretation of the term 'worker' and 'social assistance ' 
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Part A MN 15). Judges in Luxembourg have repeatedly recognised that 'a particularly restric tive interpretation' 80 of derogations of the rights of Union citizens was required in the light of EU primary law. 81 This cannot be extended to the rules on immigration and asylum, which are an integral part of the area of freedom, security and justice in line with the diverse policy objectives laid down in the EU Treaty (see above MN 6 7), which distinguish the new policy field from the historic template of the single market and Union citizenship (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 28 36). This different constitutional context for immigration and asylum law supports the search for autonomous solutions for third country nationals.
General Principles (Proportionality) 21
The supranational legal order comprises a number of unwritten general principles, which were developed by the Court of Justice on the basis of the legal traditions common to the domestic legal orders of the Member States. 82 These general principles were developed by the ECJ over the past few decades and are now applied to immigration and asylum law as an integral part of the EU legal order. As unwritten rules, general principles apply without the need for references to them in secondary legislation. They can be relied upon in order to interpret the measures adopted by the EU institutions and, in exceptional circumstances, serve as grounds for judicial review. 83 Moreover, the general principles bind Member States when implementing Union law, i. e. state authorities and domestic courts must respect the general principles when they adopt decisions or render judgments whose outcome is determined by EU law, thereby influencing the interpretation of domestic law. As we shall go on to discuss, the extent to which Member States must respect the general principles when they have implement ing discretion remains unclear (see below MN 47 48). Whenever Member States are not bound by general principles, they apply only national standards, including domestic constitutional guarantees. A narrow reading of the scope of the general principles does not leave migrants without legal protection.
22
From a conceptual perspective, the general principles underline that EU immigration and asylum law is firmly embedded into the rule of law. Traditional notions of migration law and alienation as an exclave of legal protection, which prevailed in some Member States until recently, cannot be maintained. 84 The significance of the general principles comes to the fore after the end of the legislative procedure, once domestic courts and the ECJ begin to interpret EU directives and regulations. Unexpected legal effects flowing from the interpretation of secondary law in light of general principles are a common phenomenon. 85 Judges in Luxembourg have developed a certain celebrity for dynamic interpretation, in particular with regard to Primary law although there are indications that judges take the wording, the structure and the drafting history of immigration and asylum law instruments seriously (see above MN 12). 
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Part A Acknowledging the significance of the general principles for the dynamic interpreta tion of EU migration law by the Court of Justice does not imply that they will always vindicate the position of those that criticise national legal practices. Rather, the precise meaning of the unwritten general principles has to be ascertained on a case by case basis. This exercise usually requires a thorough analysis of ECJ case law by consulting, for instance, general treatises on EU administrative law. 86 89 General principles relating to the right to defence and judicial protection will be discussed below (see below MN 37).
24
Besides human rights, primacy and direct effect, the principle of proportionality is the most relevant general principle for asylum and immigration law. In EU law, the principle of proportionality has a dual relevance: it both serves as a yardstick for the delimitation of EU competences 90 and defines the limits of state action affecting individuals. 91 It is the second scenario that is especially relevant in the field of immigration and asylum. Generally speaking, an application of the principle of proportionality requires a four pronged test: firstly, the state measure affecting indivi duals must pursue a legitimate aim; secondly, the measure must be suitable for achieving its objective; thirdly, the state action must be necessary to achieve the aim, since there are no less onerous ways available; finally, proportionality sensu stricto is assessed on the basis of a balancing exercise that takes the competing interests into account (although the ECJ sometimes merges the third and fourth criteria). 92 This four step test rationalises the application of the principle of proportionality and allows courts and academics to evaluate individual scenarios more easily.
25
It is important to understand that any assessment of proportionality is based on objective standards but nevertheless depends on the circumstances of each individual case. The abstract criteria of the four pronged test described above require an assess ment focusing on the measure in question and its effect in a specific societal context. This dependence on context implies that the degree of judicial scrutiny may depend on the subject area under consideration. There may be good reasons to grant the legislature and/or administrative authorities a margin of appreciation when assessing the suit 86 
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Part A ability, necessity or proportionality sensu stricto of the measure in question, 93 in particular in areas where courts lack information or expertise and where broader value judgments have to be made. 94 The argument in favour of discretion is particularly strong in areas without strict legal standards, such as the promotion of social integration (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 43 47).
26
In the evaluation of specific scenarios, it is necessary to clearly identify both the objective(s) pursued by the state measures and the individual interest(s) at stake. Without careful identification of the objectives and interests, the eventual balancing exercise in the final proportionality assessment sensu stricto runs the risk of being unpersuasive, since the outcome depends on the relative weight of public policy objectives and private interests. Unfortunately, the ECJ can be superfluous in the identification of the aim pursued by the EU legislature a problem that also affects the operationalisation of the principle of effet utile, for instance with regard to the Dublin 95 In such scenarios, judges should discuss the plurality of objectives openly and address them in the balancing exercise that underlies proportionality sensu stricto by adjusting the relative weight of the public policy objective(s) and private interest(s) involved. The test's dependence on context is one explanation as to why proportionality and related interpretative standards will not necessarily confer equal rights as Union citizens on third country nationals, since the former benefit from a special position under EU primary law that cannot be extended to immigration and asylum (see above MN 20).
27
The ECJ has regularly taken recourse to general principles of Union law in order to promote their application even before the expiry of the period of transposition of a directive. Where national rules fall within the scope of EU law, the Court should indeed provide the necessary interpretative guidance required by domestic courts to determine whether national rules are compatible with Union law. Therefore, the observance of general principles of Union law cannot be made conditional, in the eyes of the Court, upon the expiry of the period allowed for the transposition of a directive. 96 In cases within their jurisdiction, national courts have to interpret domestic law in line with Union law and its general principles. While this obligation is most relevant after the expiry of the transposition period, national courts are obliged, nonetheless, to refrain as far as possible from interpreting domestic law in a manner which might seriously compromise the attainment of an objective pursued by a directive from the date when it enters into force. 97 
More Favourable National Provisions 28
Most directives on immigration and asylum contain an express provision stating that the directive shall not affect the possibilities of the Member States to introduce or retain more favourable provisions a discretion which most instruments adopted in recent Introduction Part A years qualify to be limited 'insofar as these [national rules] are compatible with this Directive.' 98 These provisions in secondary legislation are generally understood to allow Member States to adopt rules in favour of third country nationals whose rights and duties are regulated by the directive in question, 99 although the precise scope of national discretion remains unclear. Both the new primary law framework of the Treaty of Lisbon and the aforementioned proviso concerning compatibility with the directive in question argue in favour of a cautious approach towards national deviations. It will be demonstrated in this section that, notwithstanding more specific prescription in individual directives, Member States cannot deviate from common rules on the basis of generic clauses on more favourable rules whenever the relevant provision of the instrument in question opts for full harmonisation.
29
Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty base for most asylum instruments allowed for the adoption of 'minimum standards' only, while rules on immigration, border controls and visas had not been subject to a similar restriction. 100 It was often argued at the time that the limitation to 'minimum standards' in EU primary law and corresponding provisions in secondary legislation should be understood, in a similar way to international human rights law, as a minimum requirement for domestic legislation, while generally allowing for more generous rules for the benefit of migrants, especially in the field of asylum legislation. 101 It is no longer relevant whether this position was correct, since the Treaty of Lisbon abandoned the restrictive Treaty base, thereby permitting a higher degree of harmonisation (see above MN 3 4). On this basis, new legislation on asylum has been adopted in the meantime allowing for more favourable national rules only insofar as they are compatible with the relevant direc tive. 102 The interpretation of these rules should acknowledge the broader objective laid down in the EU Treaty to move towards a 'Common European Asylum System' as an integral part of the area of freedom, security and justice, which generally aims for more uniformity. 103 This constitutional context supports extensive legislative activities (see above MN 5) and argues for a restrictive reading of the clauses on national deviations that compromise uniformity.
30
In order to understand the relevance of the EU law provisions on more favourable national treatment, it is important to point out that the concept of harmonisation is central to the European project, since it entails the approximation of national rules in line with the overarching objective of establishing an 'ever closer union,' 104 in which differences between Member States are replaced by common standards in line with the more specific objective of a common immigration and asylum policy in Articles 78 79 TFEU. Tellingly, regulations on immigration and asylum, such as the Schengen Borders Code, the Dublin III Regulation or the Visa Regulation, contain no provision 98 
31
The example of consumer protection illustrates how national deviations are ad dressed by the ECJ. 108 The Court of Justice establishes on a case by case basis whether individual articles in secondary legislation result in complete (full) harmonisation, which pre empts national deviations as a uniform standard, while rules that are more favourable are allowed in other scenarios as long as they do not compromise the effective and uniform application of the EU rules in question. 109 Whether an article grants Member States discretion depends on an interpretation of the provision taking into account the wording, the general scheme, the drafting history, the aims and the constitutional context (see above MN 10 18), including the Treaty objective to move towards a common immigration and asylum policy (see above MN 29). In some instances the interpretation of individual articles will be straightforward. The term 'shall' designates mandatory rules and, by contrast, the word 'may' indicates a certain level of flexibility awarded to Member States, which are not free, however, to do as they please, since national deviations are only permitted in so far as the article in question allows for differences. One may conclude by means of interpretation, for example, that Member States 'may' choose between solution A and B, while solution C would violate the directive, since it would involve going beyond state discretion. 110 With regard to the Schengen Borders Code and the Visa Code, the Court found explicitly that the objective of common standards within the Schengen area argues against Member States' discre tion. 111 In short, the definite scope for possible deviations must be ascertained on a case by case basis when interpreting EU legislation.
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As mentioned at the outset, the formulation of EU immigration and asylum directives follows different patterns. Three clauses on more favourable national provisions can be distinguished: (1) Most directives permit for national deviations only 'insofar as [they] 105 In line with Article 288 TFEU, regulations are unlike directives meant to be applied directly, thereby establishing a higher degree of harmonisation. 106 Cf. Article 53 ECHR; many immigration and asylum experts have a background in human rights law (not EU law) and therefore tend to underestimate the preference for uniformity in EU law. 107 Cf. de Witte, 'Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order', in: Craig/de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2 nd edn (OUP, 2011), p. 323 362.
108 Like migration law, consumer protection is a policy field in which more protection to the benefit of the allegedly weaker party (migrant, consumer) is often considered to be an end in itself but which nevertheless does not necessarily permit more favourable national provisions. 109 
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Part A are compatible with this Directive;' 112 these provisions require an assessment on a case by case basis as to whether specific articles allow for flexibility in line with the interpretative principles above. (2) Other directives explicitly lay down that Member States may deviate from specific provisions, which allow for the adoption of more favourable rules as a result. 113 (3) Some directives stipulate in more general terms that Member States remain free 'to adopt or maintain provisions that are more favourable to the persons to whom it applies' without indicating, like in the first scenario, that domestic rules must comply with the directive. 114 The Family Reunion Directive and the Long Term Residents Directive, neither of which contain the caveat that more favourable domestic rules concern only those 'to whom [the Directive] applies', are the most far reaching instruments. Similarly, the ECJ recognised that Member States can grant complementary status under domestic law to people whose application for international protection has been rejected as long as states do not call into question the effective implementation of the EU legislation, which in practice requires them to draw 'a clear distinction … between national protection and protection under the directive.' 115 More favourable national protection statuses do not bring about rights under the EU asylum acquis, since Member States act within the scope of their retained powers. 116 In short, the precise space for national deviations depends upon EU law; if new directives are adopted, Member States may lose room for manoeuvre they had held previously.
Application in Domestic Law 34
Regulations such as the Dublin III Regulation or the Schengen Borders Code are by their very nature directly applicable in domestic legal systems and are therefore binding on all national authorities and courts applying EU immigration and asylum law, whereas directives must be transposed into national law before they may be invoked before national courts as a matter of principle. 117 In contrast to regulations, directives often leave some discretion to Member States as to how to regulate certain questions, although the precise scope of flexibility depends on the interpretation of the instrument in question (see above MN 31). 118 It is well established in ECJ case law that directives 
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Part A can also be directly applicable if they have not been implemented correctly by the Member States during the transposition period, if the provision in question is clear, precise and unconditional and it seeks to confer rights upon individuals against the state. 119 Moreover, domestic courts are bound to interpret national law, so far as possible, in light of the directive in order to achieve the result sought by the EU legislature, including in situations when the conditions for direct effect have not been met. 120 In these cases, a directive may be indirectly relied upon.
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EU law concentrates on the legislative harmonisation of substantive rules and corresponding procedural guarantees, while the actual application of supranational rules to individuals is left to the Member States as a matter of principle. This entails that the day to day decision making in immigration and asylum cases is done by national authorities, whose decisions can be challenged in domestic courts which may ask the ECJ to interpret EU rules under the preliminary reference procedure of Article 267 TFEU. Given that immigration and asylum have a tangible practical and operational dimension, 121 the EU institutions support the convergence of administra tive practices through guidelines on the interpretation of EU law, networks among practitioners and financial support for transnational cooperation. 122 There are also examples of enhanced transnational cooperation, in particular through the FRONTEX border agency and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). These prototypes for transnational cooperation focus on convergence rather than the direct application of the EU asylum and immigration acquis towards individuals following a quasi federal model. While EU primary law permits and supports closer transnational cooperation, it does not at present sanction the move towards a quasi federal bureaucracy replacing national authorities in the day to day decision making on migration issues (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 7).
36
When adjudicating on individual cases, Member States apply their own domestic rules on administrative and judicial procedure unless there are more specific proce dural rules in secondary legislation. 123 EU immigration and asylum legislation contains numerous provisions on procedural aspects, although many of these clauses remain abstract when stipulating, for instance, that Member States 'shall provide for reasonable time limits and other necessary rules for the applicant to exercise his or her right to an effective remedy.' 124 These provisos require the continued existence of national admin istrative rules, which must be interpreted in the light of EU law in cases of conflict; national laws fill the gaps of EU immigration and asylum law. This application of domestic procedural guarantees is often referred to as the principle of procedural autonomy. 125 The ECJ has repeatedly reaffirmed this principle, while also establishing two limits: when applying national rules Member States must ensure, firstly, that the rules for EU related claims are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of equivalence) and, secondly, that they do not render the exercise of rights conferred by Community law practically impossible or excessively difficult (principle of effectiveness). 126 The principle of effectiveness, in particular, is Introduction Part A often used by the ECJ to limit the discretion of Member States, although its operatio nalisation in practice remains inherently difficult to predict. 127 
37
National rules on administrative and judicial procedure must comply not only with specific rules in EU legislation and the limits to the principle of procedural autonomy (see above MN 35 36) but also with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which binds Member States whenever they are implementing Union law (see below MN 47 48). In this respect, the right to effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter plays a central role, since it is often relied upon to challenge restrictive national provisos. 128 ECJ judges have made clear that Article 47 of the Charter applies in these instances, although the case law also emphasises that the special circumstances of asylum procedures can be taken into account, for instance through short time limits; 129 similarly, the Charter does not require either automatic suspensive effect or the guarantee to remain in the territory pending proceedings. 130 In short, the precise contents of procedural human rights must be analysed carefully taking into account supranational and international case law. 131 The same applies to the human rights guarantees for administrative procedure in Articles 41 42 of the Charter, which can be applied within domestic legal orders as general principles of Union law. 132 The relevance of these supranational guarantees will also be dependent upon the state of affairs in domestic legal orders: Member States with sophisticated procedural guarantees will be less affected than countries with limited options for judicial review.
III. Territorial Scope (Member State Participation) 38
Mirroring the asymmetrical composition of the intergovernmental Schengen Agree ment, EU immigration and asylum law contains country specific opt outs to this date. More specifically, we need to distinguish different opt out arrangements for the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, which were fortified by some procedural twists and a novel degree of selectivity in the Treaty of Lisbon. Unfortunately, the country specific opt outs do not follow a uniform rationale. There are differences between the rules governing Denmark on the one hand and the United Kingdom and Ireland on the other. Moreover, we are faced with two sets of rules for these countries: firstly, measures building upon the Schengen acquis laid down in the Schengen Protocol and, 133 secondly, measures in the area of freedom, security and justice that do not form part of the Schengen acquis, are governed by separate protocols 134 with special procedures. 135 Altogether, we therefore need to distinguish four distinct opt out arrangements for the United Kingdom/Ireland and Denmark and for measures (not) building upon the Schengen acquis. 136 
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In practice, the recitals of all legislative acts indicate whether the United Kingdom, Ireland and/or Denmark are bound by the relevant instrument and whether it is considered to build upon the Schengen acquis. 137 The overall picture emanating from these diverse arrangements is complex and can be difficult to monitor. In order to facilitate orientation, the introductions to the different parts of this volume include a list of the measures commented upon with an indication of whether the measure in question applies to the United Kingdom, Ireland and/or Denmark. Corresponding overviews can be found in the sections on border controls and visas (see Thym 
Denmark 40
Denmark did not object to the abolition of internal border controls and had subscribed to the intergovernmental Schengen Conventions prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam. It nonetheless asked for an opt out, since the supranationalisation of justice and home affairs called into question caveats on these matters that had served as justifications for the Danish government in its campaign for a 'yes' vote in the second referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht. 138 However, the Danish government did not want to leave the Schengen zone and therefore negotiated a 'political opt in' and 'legal opt out' 139 , which maintained its status as a member of the Schengen group while guaranteeing that the supranational integration method would not apply; the opt out is based on 'methodology rather than ideology.' 140 As a result, Denmark cannot at present unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland opt into supranational decision making on a case by case basis. However, it is allowed to terminate or modify the opt out by means of a simple declaration the activation of which has been made politically conditional upon another referendum which the government has so far hesitated to call despite occasional calls to the contrary. 141 At the time of writing, it seemed that a referendum might be called in 
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In line with its original compromise to oppose supranationalisation as a member of the Schengen area, Denmark retains, with regard to measures building upon the Schengen acquis, 142 the right to 'decide within a period of 6 months … whether it will implement this decision in its national law.' If it decides to do so, this decision will create an obligation under international law between Denmark and other Member States.' 143 As a result, Denmark is bound by measures building upon the Schengen acquis on the basis of public international law. 144 The experience in recent years does not indicate any major legal issues directly related to the opt out. 145 One reason for this comparatively trouble free functioning of the opt out may be the similarity between the Danish position and the situation of the neighbouring countries Norway and Iceland, which are both associated with the Schengen acquis on the basis of an international association agreement (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 29). Mirroring its status under the Schengen Protocol, Denmark has associated itself with the Dublin II Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 on asylum jurisdic tion through the conclusion of international agreements between Denmark and the Community/Union through the conclusion of an international agreement. 146 This peculiarity confirms that the Danish opt out is not as such directed against European cooperation on immigration and asylum law.
United Kingdom and Ireland 42
In contrast to Denmark, the United Kingdom objects to the political project of border free travel. Consecutive British governments have maintained that the geogra phical position of the British Isles, the traditional absence of domestic identification requirements (such as ID cards) and the symbolism of Schengen cooperation as a means for closer European integration warned against British participation. 147 None theless, the Labour government under Tony Blair's leadership was willing to consent, at the final stages of the intergovernmental conference for the Amsterdam Treaty, to the integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU framework under the condition that Britain retained a special status on the basis of a flexible opt out with an option to sign up to individual projects. Ireland was factually obliged to follow its neighbour, since it wanted to maintain the Common Travel Area providing for passport free travel in the British Isles, including Northern Ireland. 148 As in the case of monetary 142 By contrast, initiatives which are not part of the Schengen acquis are subject to a strict opt out. 143 . 144 The Protocol refrains from a definition of international law; in essence, general principles of Union law, such as direct and supreme effect, and the ECJ's jurisdiction do not apply. 145 In 2011, the Danish government announced plans to reintroduce limited border controls at the insistence of the populist peoples' party. The project was abandoned when the general elections in 2012 brought a centre left government into power. 146 
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Part A union, the asymmetry of the Schengen law was characterised by an inherent pragma tism: granting an opt out to three Member States was a compromise to secure the unanimity necessary for Treaty change. Britain would not have consented to supra nationalisation in Amsterdam without an opt out.
43
Upon closer inspection, the British/Irish opt out is the most prolific expression of the à la carte logic of principled freedom for Member States. 149 Firstly, Britain and Ireland retain the right, during the legislative process, to 'notify … that they wish to take part' in the adoption of a proposal. 150 On this basis, the United Kingdom and/or Ireland took the route of ex ante participation in the legislative procedure; they decided to participate in many (not all) measures on immigration and asylum (the precise scope of participation will be confirmed in the sections with introductions to the chapters on border controls, immigration and asylum; see above MN 39). Originally, the arrange ment did not provide for subsequent withdrawal after a decision to participate had been made; any decision to opt in was a one way street towards closer integration. The Lisbon Treaty reversed this situation by granting Britain and Ireland the option of unilateral withdrawal (see below MN 45). Secondly, both states retain the option of ex post accession at a later stage. Britain and Ireland 'may at any time request to take part in some or all of the provisions' that define the original Schengen acquis or which have been adopted in other segments in the area of freedom, security and justice. 151 Indeed, both countries decided to join in important areas of the original Schengen cooperation, albeit without subscribing to the abolition of internal border controls. 152 The combined effect of ex ante and ex post participation was quite constructive.
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The United Kingdom's and Ireland's freedom of choice is not absolute. The Schen gen Protocol limits participation to proposals and initiatives to those 'which are capable of autonomous application.' 153 This meant, in the eyes of the Council, that two British requests for participation in the borders agency Frontex and a regulation on security features in travel documents had to be rejected, since both were intractably linked to aspects of the Schengen acquis, in particular to border controls, which the United Kingdom had refused to endorse. 154 The ECJ confirmed this standpoint in two judgments which demonstrated a certain willingness on the side of the Court to ensure that the opt out arrangements do not undermine the uniform and coherent application of Schengen law. 155 Since the Lisbon Treaty leaves the relevant provisions intact, this case law remains relevant: Britain may not sign up to measures building on the Schengen acquis if they require the application of the broader legislative context. 156 Introduction Part A During the intergovernmental conference drafting the Lisbon Treaty, the British government demanded and obtained further flexibility. 157 London insisted upon the right to opt out of any amendment of instruments in whose adoption it had earlier decided to participate (for example, the Asylum Qualification Directive 158 ). By means of a simple declaration, the UK and/or Ireland may withdraw itself from an ongoing legislative process, although it is bound by the instrument the other Member States want to modify. 159 To be sure, this can only be done when amendments are made: without a proposal for legislative change, Britain cannot opt out. In cases of amendments, how ever, London retains the ability to pick and choose as it wishes. From the perspective of legal certainty, it is regrettable that Britain (and Ireland) will continue to be bound by previous rules, even if these rules are repealed with regard to all other Member States because of an amendment. 160 Whenever the British or the Irish exclude themselves from amendments, the Council may vote against British participation in related instruments, from which the UK and/or Ireland do not wish to retract, if such 'rump' legislation cannot be applied effectively. 161 The example of Frontex demonstrates that the ECJ may support the Council in cases of conflict (see above MN 44).
IV. Human Rights and International Law 46
EU legislation is based on the general commitment in Article 6 TEU to recognise the rights, liberties and principles laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see below MN 47 50), the European Convention of Human Rights (see below MN 51 52) and the unwritten general principles of Union law, which may include international human rights (see below MN 53 55) . It is beyond doubt that legislation in the field of immigration and asylum must comply with the human rights standards put forward in the Charter and related documents. By contrast, the weight of international treaties concluded with third states requires careful analysis, since the ECJ traditionally attaches great importance to the autonomy of the EU legal order vis à vis the international legal environment (see below MN 56 60).
EU Charter 47
The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon rendered the Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding: the rights and principles in the Charter shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 162 The Charter is binding on the EU legislature and can constitute grounds to challenge the validity of legislative acts before the Court of Justice (irrespec tive of whether the recitals of EU legislation invoke the Charter expressly). 163 
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Part A directives and regulations have to be interpreted in accordance with the Charter as far as possible in cases of potential conflict (see above MN 14). Aside from the EU institutions, Member States are also bound by the Charter but 'only when they are implementing Union law.' 164 The precise meaning of that provision has been (and still is) subject to intense debate in judicial and academic circles that culminated in an exchange of blows between the European Court of Justice and the German Federal Constitutional Court. 165 In its Åkerberg Fransson judgment, the ECJ maintained that Member States are bound 'within the scope of European Union law.' 166 Closer inspection demonstrates that the precise scope of this formulation remains ambiguous and has been subject to a number of restrictive follow up judgments. 167 
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Any decision on whether national measures fall within the scope of the Charter therefore requires careful analysis of whether the factual circumstances of the dispute and the domestic provision in question are covered by EU legislation on immigration and asylum ratione materiae, personae, temporis and loci. 168 Whenever EU legislation does not apply to specific subject areas or categories of persons, the Charter doesn't apply either. One may activate national constitutions and/or the ECHR instead, but the ECJ does not hold jurisdiction on these instruments. 169 This means, by way of example, that the Charter applies to the living conditions of those with subsidiary protection status (as far as EU legislation regulates their status in Articles 20 35 Asylum Qualifica tion Directive 2011/95/EU), while the same subject areas cannot be analysed in light of the Charter for those awarded complementary humanitarian protection under domestic law. 170 Similarly, not all border control activities can be assessed in the light of the Charter: the latter applies only in so far as the Schengen Borders Code or related instruments prescribe obligations that the national border police has to respect. 171 Notwithstanding these caveats, it is well established that the exercise of national implementing discretion can be judged in the light of the EU Charter in cases where EU legislation leaves the Member States different options how to achieve the objective prescribed in a Directive or Regulation. 172 
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When interpreting the Charter, the meaning of specific guarantees can often be identified under recourse to the European Convention of Human Rights and corre sponding case law of the ECtHR, since the Charter calls for a parallel interpretation of both instruments whenever it contains rights which are corresponding to guarantees in the ECHR. 173 To refer to the case law of the human rights court in Strasbourg is standard practice for EU judges in Luxembourg, even though the EU has not yet acceded formally to the ECHR (see below MN 51). Moreover, the official explanations attached to the Charter are to be given due regard (see above MN 13). As is the case with most human rights, guarantees in the Charter are not absolute: interferences can Introduction Part A be justified if they pursue a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner. 174 When it comes to the contents, the Charter contains both individual rights and more abstract 'princi ples', in particular in Title IV on solidarity. 175 Principles require implementation by means of either Union or domestic legislation, which can be applied by courts only in conjunction with implementing measures (although the precise degree of legal obliga tions remains uncertain). 176 In practice, this concerns primarily the social rights in Articles 27 to 38 of the Charter.
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The relevance of individual guarantees will be discussed in the thematic introductions to the different chapters of this commentary. Relevant provisions include procedural guarantees for administrative proceedings and judicial review (see above MN 37). With regard to border controls and visas, the extraterritorial application and the relative liberty of public authorities in regulating access by migrants to EU territory are pertinent (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 32 34). In the context of legal migration, the guarantee of private and family life in Article 7 of the Charter (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 52 56), the provisions on equal treatment (see ibid., MN 37 42) as well as limited guarantees on the labour market and intra European mobility deserve closer attention (see ibid., MN 34 35), whereas Articles 4 and 18 of the Charter are crucial for asylum law, since they reaffirm guarantees under the ECHR (see Hailbronner/Thym, Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy, MN 56 63).
European Convention 51
In its human rights case law, the ECJ has traditionally afforded special significance to the European Convention of Human Rights, although it does not formally have the rank of primary Union law. Article 6(2) TEU allows for the formal accession of the EU to the ECHR and a draft accession agreement had been negotiated but was blocked by the ECJ due to concerns about the autonomy of the supranational order. 177 Remarkably, asylum law was one of the issues of concern for judges in Luxembourg, 178 since the human rights court in Strasbourg had challenged the principle of mutual respect, which, in the eyes of the ECJ, underlies cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice, including the Dublin III Regulation (see Hruschka/Maiani, Regulation (EU) No 604/ 2013 Article 3 MN 7 16). It should be noted in this respect that the future formal accession of the EU to the ECHR would primarily have procedural consequences and would not change the constitutional status of the ECHR under EU law, 179 which, even after accession, would retain a formal rank below primary law, like other international treaties concluded by the EU (see below MN 55). This implies that the position of the ECJ prevails in a rare case of conflict with the ECtHR, while the principled orientation of the Charter at the ECHR guarantees widespread convergence in regular circum stances (see above MN 49). 174 A generic provision on the justification of restrictions can be found in Article 52(1) of the Charter. 175 
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Although the ECHR contains no right to asylum, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has become increasingly relevant to immigration and asylum law in recent years. This will be discussed in this commentary for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR (see Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 52 56) and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment as well as the guarantee of an effective remedy in line with Articles 3 and 13 ECHR (see Hailbronner/Thym, Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy, MN 56 60). Moreover, the question of a right to entry and extraterritorial applicability will be discussed (see Thym, Legal Framework for Entry and Border Controls, MN 32 39).
Geneva Convention and International Human Rights 53
Article 78(1) TFEU mandates that the EU asylum acquis complies with the Geneva Convention, the 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties. This obligation has been put into effect by the ECJ, which reaffirmed, in a number of judgments, that the EU asylum acquis must be interpreted taking into account the Geneva Convention (see Hailbronner/Thym, Legal Framework for EU Asylum Policy, MN 47 54). From a legal perspective, this obligation to respect the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol flows from EU primary law, since the EU has not formally acceded to the Geneva Convention or assumed the functions of Member States by means of functional succession (as it had previously done with regard to the GATT Agreement). 180 As a result, the ECJ holds no autonomous jurisdiction to interpret the Geneva Convention: it only does so in conjunction with secondary Union law, in particular the Asylum Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU. Recital 23 of the Directive states explicitly that its provisions should 'guide the competent national bodies of Member States in the application of the Geneva Conven tion.' It also reaffirms that the Geneva Convention and the Protocol constitute the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of refugees. 181 
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International human rights treaties are not directly binding upon the European Union, since it has not acceded to them under international law. They can however be relied upon indirectly as a source of inspiration for the interpretation of the unwritten general principles of Union law that complement the human rights in the Charter. 182 On this basis, the ECJ recognised explicitly that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 183 can be relied upon in order to identify the contents of EU human rights although judicial practice has remained sketchy, not least since the international guarantees on migration usually fall short of the ECtHR jurisprudence. 184 Moreover, the ECJ emphasised that the views of international treaty bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee, are not legally binding. 185 Other international agreements cannot be consid ered legally binding ipso jure, since the ECJ insists that they must be binding for all Member States. As a result, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 186 and the Introduction Part A settled case law that international agreements concluded by the EU institutions 'form an integral part of [Union] law' 196 and benefit, as a result, from the same effects as regular EU law within the domestic legal orders of the Member States, including primacy over national law in cases of conflict. 197 The ECJ assumes, moreover, that international agreements can be relied upon to challenge the validity of EU legislation. 198 Provisions of international agreements concluded by the EU have a hierarchical status above secondary legislation but below the EU Treaties; not even resolutions of the UN Security Council may claim a higher normative rank than EU primary law, 199 nor can the European Convention on Human Rights and corresponding ECtHR case law after the EU's accession (see above MN 51) .
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It should be highlighted that the practical relevance of international agreements concluded by the EU is compromised significantly by settled ECJ case law rendering the effects mentioned above subject to the direct applicability of the relevant interna tional agreements. Provisions in international treaties that are not directly applicable cannot be relied upon by individuals or courts in order to challenge the validity of secondary Union law or domestic rules. 200 In assessing whether international treaties can be directly applied, the ECJ correctly highlights their international legal character and the corresponding applicability of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in the context of interpretation of agreements concluded by the EU, 201 which may deviate from the interpretative standards for supranational EU law (see above MN 10 20). This implies, in accordance with settled case law, that even provisions with an identical wording may have a different meaning to the equivalent rules in EU legal instruments. 202 While the ECJ has traditionally been rather strict towards international agreements with a global reach, such as world trade law or the Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is more generous when it comes to association agreements. 203 Among the association agreements, the Ankara Agreement between the EEC and Turkey has become particularly relevant to immigration law in recent years (see above MN 19; and Thym, Legal Framework for EU Immigration Policy, MN 58).
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International agreements concluded by Member States (not the European Union) are not binding on the EU institutions under public international law. While international human rights instruments ratified by all Member States can be invoked indirectly in the context of the unwritten general principles of Union law (see above MN 54), other agreements concluded by Member States cannot be relied upon in the EU legal order, even if they have been ratified by all Member States: the ECJ maintains that such agreements can only be invoked if they reflect customary international law and are directly applicable 204 a double condition that is rarely met. In so far as these agreements were concluded prior to EU accession (or the conferral of corresponding competences to the EU level), they may benefit, however, from the safeguard clause in Introduction Part A Article 351 TFEU which provides that the EU Treaties and secondary legislation do not prevent Member States from fulfilling their obligations under pre existing agreements with third states. 205 This safeguard for earlier agreements is static, i. e. Member States have lost the capacity to amend them. 206 Furthermore, the conclusion of new agree ments in areas covered by secondary EU legislation is an exclusive competence of the European Union. 207 In practice, respect for existing obligations is often guaranteed through explicit safeguard clauses in EU secondary legislation stating that Member States remain free to retain more favourable national provisions in line with interna tional agreements (see Hailbronner/Arévalo, Directive 2003/86/EC Article 3 MN 16 19). From a legal point of view, these provisions are declaratory in nature in so far as they relate to pre existing agreements concluded prior to accession to the European Union that are covered by Article 351 TFEU.
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In line with the objective of protecting existing legal obligations, explicit safeguard clauses in secondary legislation affect only Member States that had ratified the agree ment(s) in question before the adoption of secondary EU legislation. They can concern bilateral treaties on commerce and navigation, which never gained much influence in most domestic legal orders. 208 More important are multilateral agreements within the framework of the Council of Europe, which like the bilateral treaties on commerce and navigation confer reciprocal rights only upon the nationals of state parties and did not gain much practical influence either. 209 212 Given that the nationals of Norway and Iceland hold extensive rights under the EEA Agreement, the practical relevance of these conventions is extremely limited at present: they relate in particular to Turkish nationals residing legally in Member States to which the conventions apply.
